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* LIBERTY AND EQUALITY UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 22 73
avoid both the challenge of developing an independent jurisprudence and
exposure to the charge of "judicial activism."
My previous piece published in these pages, on Freedom of Expression,
dealt with constitutional provisions very similar to the First Amendment,
and demonstrated how in that context the California Supreme Court has
for the most part met that challenge in an open and creative way. The state
constitutional provisions which are the focus of this piece might be said to
provide the court with an easier route to an independent jurisprudence. This
is especially true of article I, section 1, which has no federal counterpart.
But developing an independent jurisprudence even when it is not tied to
analogous federal constitutional language is a challenging enterprise. If it
is to be conducted with integrity it requires the court to engage in an enter-
prise not unlike the interpretive enterprise that the U.S. Supreme Court has
confronted under the federal Constitution. That enterprise entails difficult
questions that are often not readily answered by examination of the text or
by historical facts. It may require the court to identify what values are be-
ing protected by the constitutional framework, and to decide to what extent
courts, as distinguished from legislatures, have responsibility for protecting
those values. We have become accustomed to translating these questions into
doctrinal language like "fundamental rights" and "suspect classes," CCstrict
scrutiny" and "rational basis," but these categories, useful as they may be, are
in turn judicial constructs which do not inhere in constitutional language or
history. Their definition, and their application, ultimately require judges to
consider arguments, and to make choices, among competing visions for a
democratic society that recognizes both majority rule and minority rights.
In giving definition to concepts of "liberty" and "equality" over the
years, the California Supreme Court has of necessity been engaged in that
task. To a modern critical eye it may not have always performed with con-
sistency or clarity, but that is understandable, given the complexities of the
problems, changing social views, and the inevitable differences in outlook
among justices. For what it is worth, both as a former justice and as a stu-
dent of the law, I would give the court's historical record in developing an
independent state jurisprudence high marks.
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